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I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of piracy is nothing new. The term itself traces back to 500 B.C.
and the ancient worlds of Greece and Rome, when pirates attacked and looted
ships sailing the Mediterranean. In music, piracy roots itself in the 1920s, when
radio stations played music without compensating artists, despite it being “close to

* J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, May 2007; B.A., Columbia University, cum laude,
May 2002. This Article was written while enrolled in the course “Special Problems in the Music
Industry,” taught with expertise by Professor Marc Goodman at Pepperdine University School of Law
in the Spring of 2006. The author would like to thank her mother, a recognized voice of Israel, for
inspiring this writing; her brother, an aspiring musician and profound writer, who’s editing skills helped
this Article materialize; and her father, her role model in academia, who initially mocked the notion of
“moral rights” in the music industry, yet ultimately found the product absolutely necessary for future
generation’s continued appreciation of one language we all understand—music.
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impossible” to copy vinyl records.1 During the 1960s, with the advent of the blank
tape, the public began dubbing mixed tapes and recording live concerts.2 Fastforward to 2007 and the prevalence of online piracy, where a relatively young
phenomenon presents a unique challenge to the music industry and recording
artists.
The increased challenge for protecting copyrights in the music industry is
due in large part to the new technology available to the public. File-sharing and
peer-to-peer networks are too fast, easy and convenient for the industry to come up
with effective modes of control and regulation.3 Despite copyright infringement
issues, artists’ moral interests are also severely jeopardized, since an artist’s work
is so readily available to the public and “vulnerable to disregard, infringement and
abuse.”4
In an era when technology—uploading, downloading, burning,
streaming, copying, file-sharing, hard-drive swapping—is developing at a faster
rate than the laws regulating it, or which the record companies, publishing houses
or lobbyists can control, the exigency for moral rights development in copyright
law must be recognized as a legal priority for the music industry.5
The goal of American Copyright Law embodied in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, reads in pertinent part, “Congress shall
have Power. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”6 The current focus of this constitutional principle is
based on an economic paradigm and does not address the significance of moral
issues pertaining to musical artists. Although U.S. copyright legislation does grant
a limited version of moral rights to “visual” artists,7 there are no such rights
afforded to musical artists, or any works that fall outside the definition “work of
visual art.”8

1
Darcie-Nicole Wicknick, The RIAA Music Downloading Controversy: Both Sides of the Record,
http://www.musicbizadvice.com/a_little_history_on_music_piracy%20.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Wicknick].
2
Wicknick, supra note 1. Piracy exists in four basic categories: first, pirate recordings
(unauthorized distribution of the sound without packaging, i.e. no liner notes); second, counterfeit
recordings (unauthorized recordings of the sound and packaging); third, bootleg recordings
(unauthorized recording of live concerts, radio or television broadcast); and fourth, online piracy
(unauthorized uploading or downloading of copyrighted material). RIAA, Anti-Piracy, (2003) http://
www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp [hereinafter Anti-Piracy].
3
It is estimated that “[a]t any given moment, five million Americans are participating in filesharing, making for a total of 2.6 billion downloads each month.” Stacey M. Lantagne, Note, The
Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording Industry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269,
273 (2004) [hereinafter Lantagne]. Each year, the industry is estimated to lose $4.2 billion to piracy
worldwide. Anti-Piracy, supra note 2.
4
Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights and Copyright Harmonisation: Prospects for an
‘International Moral Right’?, 17TH BILETA ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2-3 (2002), http://\www.bileta.ac.
uk/pages/conference%20papers.aspx (follow “Moral Rights and Copyright Harmonisation-Prospects for
an ‘International Moral Right’” Hyperlink) [hereinafter Sundara Rajan].
5
Id.
6
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
7
See 17 U.S.C. et seq. (2006) (commonly referred to as the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990).
8
Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Right Societies, and Moral Rights for Music: A Need
in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL.

2007

THE MORAL RIGHTS ACT OF 2007

183

The grant of moral rights would entitle a musical artist to the protection of
every aspect of each creation, including the protection and respect for the artist’s
moral intentions and creative content. I hope to prove that by exercising the
implication of moral rights, as they pertain to musical copyright, we will generate a
new and significant perspective in the ongoing discussion of copyright law.
Ultimately, this will empower us to build a more thorough defensive argument in
the struggle for protecting the “exclusive Right” of “Authors,” as delineated by the
U.S. Constitution.9 My goal with this Article is to create a new paradigm in which
the public, recording companies, publishing houses, and licensing companies
approach a work of authorship.
Moral rights (also commonly referred to as droit moral) developed from the
theory that an artist “expresses his or her personality and individual traits in a work
and one cannot separate the artist from the work.”10 Moral rights are based on “a
belief that artistic creation is something more than an attempt to earn a livelihood.
The creative act results in a special relationship between the creator and his
work.”11 While copyright is a property right, moral rights are considered a human
right.
There are at least four types of recognized moral rights:
(1) attribution: the right to be given credit and to claim credit for a work, and to
deny credit if the work is changed; (2) integrity: the right to ensure that the work is
not changed without the artist’s consent; (3) publication: the right not to reveal a
work before its creator is satisfied with it; and (4) retraction: the right to renounce a
12
work and withdraw it from sale or display.

These rights are independent of and different from traditional copyrights. As
opposed to the economic, material and physical nature of current copyright law,
moral rights do not emphasize economics, but rather the more philosophical and
less alienable nature of artistic creativity (though the exercise of them may have
economic consequences, which would not differ from remedies available under
existing copyright law).13 For this reason, developing moral rights in United States
copyright law is a challenge—it requires a new understanding by Congress, the
recording industry, the public, and artists about what it means to be a creator.14 If

PROP. L.J. 1, 17 (2001) [hereinafter Desai].
9
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
10
Desai, supra note 8, at 11 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See generally Cheryl Swack,
Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between
France and the United States, 22 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 361 (1998) (discussing the historical
development of the idea to protect artistic creation in continental Europe) [hereinafter Swack].
11
Sundara Rajan, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasis added).
12
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (8th ed. 2004). There is also droit de suite, also known as the
artist resale right, which is closely connected to the concept of moral rights. Id. at 534.
13
Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Burned? 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1096-97 (1992) [hereinafter Zabatta].
14
Principally, five groups stand to lose from piracy: (1) music pirates, because the recording
industry and law enforcement officials are beginning to crack down on the problem; (2) consumers,
because illegal copying produces inferior quality tracks and furthermore drives up costs of CDs to
compensate for lost sales; (3) honest retailers, because market prices cannot compete with prices of
cheap illegal copies; (4) record companies, because eighty-five percent of records released never recoup
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all these parties can come to understand what moral rights legislation really means,
and not how much money it generates, then it could be possible to conquer piracy
with a new additional moral element to the United States Copyright Act.15
It must be emphasized that the value of a work of authorship is more than its
mere financial worth.16 Moral rights benefit artists who view their creation as
something more than a livelihood, and who would be satisfied with an injunction
in lieu of monetary compensation to ensure the integrity of a work of authorship.17
But, when, and if moral rights are recognized, there will be a definite economic
impact on recording contracts, licensing agreements, and reproductions, to name a
few products of the music industry.18 Those who are concerned with the adverse
economic effects of moral rights legislation should understand that this legislation
will only impact economic rights in a limited way.
I admit, moral rights may not be the ultimate solution for the impact of
illegal downloading, but there must, at the very least, be a proposal to expand the
limited reach of economic rights, which by themselves are not protecting the music
industry from its potential demise. Even though the public finds the bounty of
piracy to be cheap and easy, the bottom line is that it is illegal. Moral rights offer a
new approach to fight piracy. Whether or not it is a stronger remedy has yet to be
seen. If as a society we intend to protect both the economic value of a work of art,
as well as the value of the creator’s moral intentions, then we must recognize the
importance of moral rights legislation.
This Article seeks to implement a moral rights clause in the United States
Copyright Act applicable to the legitimate interests of musicians and
complementary to existing economic principles. Part II discusses the historical
framework of moral rights legislation, its prevalence in Europe, and its
establishment in the United States under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(“VARA”) of the Copyright Act.19 Part III discusses the current state of affairs,
America’s reluctance to moral rights in lieu of other legislative remedies, as well
as the musician’s inferior relationship to recording and licensing companies. This
section also addresses why economic-based litigation and legislation are not the
most productive models to combat music piracy.20 Part IV tackles the deficiencies
in the current U.S. Copyright Act, and sets forth draft language for “The Moral
Rights Act of 2007.”21 Part V entertains potential opposition to this Bill, including
recording companies, publishing houses, illegal file-sharers and digital sampling or
mashing artists, and focuses on why this opposition should not prevail.22 Part VI

costs, and consequently, the companies’ reduced income cannot support the development of new artists
and the expansion of the music business in general; and finally (5) artists, because they lose royalties
and the respect they ultimately deserve. Anti-Piracy, supra note 2.
15
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
16
See Swack¸ supra note 10, at 361-62.
17
Id.
18
See generally Desai, supra note 8 (discussing the music licensing scheme in the United States).
19
See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 36-115 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 116-156 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 157-170 and accompanying text.
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concludes the Article, supporting my belief that the proposed legislation should
pass constitutional muster, as a logical extension of VARA under the Copyright
Act, and because it promotes constitutional principles, namely the “Progress” of
“useful Arts” and the “exclusive Right” of “Authors” “Writings.”23

II.

THE HISTORY OF MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Moral rights emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century, following
centuries of musical, literary, and artistic creativity.24 Moral rights developed
initially in France and spread to continental Europe to protect an artist’s personal
right in the overall integrity of his or her work and to protect Europe’s cultural
property.25 On the other hand, the United States, “[b]usy with the economic
exploitation” and development of its own country, “perhaps, neglected the arts,”26
resulting in little moral rights legislation. However, if we turn the clock forward to
the present day, we find that the United States has now developed an expansive
artistic legacy of its own. Thus, to protect the interests of American citizens, the
need for legitimate and legal defense of moral rights exists now more than ever.
The European system, via the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, played an important role for the development of moral
rights in the United States.27 The Berne Convention Treaty sought to harmonize
moral and economic rights, so that both rights would coexist when a work of
authorship materialized.28 Principally, the United States motivated to join the

23

See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
Swack, supra note 10, at 363 (citations omitted). “Throughout time, European cities, ‘from the
classical Greek period in Athens, the neo-classical in Rome, the medieval and gothic art in various
continental cities, the high Renaissance in Florence, and the late nineteenth-century impressionism in
Paris,’ have housed the major centers of art.” Id.
25
Id. at 363-64. “French revolutionary laws were similarly concerned with vesting control of
intellectual works with their creators, combined with the desire to foster the dissemination of
knowledge and the protection of economic interests. As with the Venetian privilege, French
revolutionary laws gave creators control over their works by requiring printers to obtain ‘formal written
permission’ from authors. This put creators in a better position not only to secure economic benefits
but also to limit distortion of their work.” Thierry Joffrain, Comment, Deriving a (Moral) Right for
Creators, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 735, 748 (2001) [hereinafter Joffrain]. Some form of moral rights also
exists in Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, and Canada. Desai, supra note 8, at 12.
26
Swack, supra note 10, at 364.
27
Desai, supra note 8, at 13.
28
See Paris Act of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Although this is beyond the
scope of this paper, “efforts to harmoni[z]e protection [on an international level] have been consistently
unsuccessful.” Rajan, supra note 4, at 2. However, “[t]he solid presence of moral rights on the
international copyright scene [discussions including how to incorporate Berne into The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property/World Trade Organization (TRIPS/WTO) system, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the Copyright Harmonization Directives of the
European Union] suggests a degree of international consensus that moral rights should be protected.”
Id. at 4. Furthermore, music piracy is an international phenomenon, such that the inclusion of moral
rights legislation in the United States would have a positive impact on the international world via Berne
principles.
24
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Berne Convention because each Berne signatory enjoyed the copyright protections
of all other signatory nations.29
The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988, and in doing so, the
Berne Convention Implementation Act imposed changes to United States
copyright law.30 Article 6bis of the international treaty of the Berne Convention
granted authors the moral rights of attribution and integrity, and the U.S. thereby
needed to comply with this requirement.31 However, the United States only
exercised minimal compliance with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention “by
finding that a few copyright provisions, unfair competition law, state statutes, and
some common law remedies provided enough moral rights protection to meet the
demands of the Berne Convention.”32
In 1990, the United States implemented VARA, which was the first federal
legislation to conclusively grant the moral rights of attribution and integrity to
works of visual art.33 In Europe, there are also the moral rights of divulgation and
retraction, two rights the United States has yet to consider in any legislation.34 The
irony is that Congress must have thought moral rights important, because why else
would Congress allege in 1988 that the United States complied with Berne
requirements, and two years later, implement VARA? Unfortunately, despite only
offering two of the four recognized moral rights, VARA further offers no
protection for musical works, because they do not fall within the definition of
“visual art.”35
I will now explore how Congress’ deference to state statutes, common law
opinions, and economic legislation does not address the need for moral rights and
the challenges that arise without them.

29

Joffrain, supra note 25, at 750.
Desai, supra note 8, at 13-14. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) administers
the Berne Convention. Although there is no “international copyright,” most countries have agreed to
the basic tenets of: (1) the right to authorize reproduction of an artist’s work; (2) the right to authorize
translation of the work; (3) the right to authorize public performance of the work; and (4) the right to
authorize adaptations or alternations to the work. See RIAA, Copyright Laws available at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/copyright/laws.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Copyright
Laws].
31
Desai, supra note 8, at 13 (citation omitted).
32
Id. at 14. (citations omitted). See also H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 33-34 (1988). See infra notes
36-115 (discussing the deficiencies with current copyright provisions, unfair competition law, state
statutes, and common law remedies).
33
17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (1994).
34
Desai, supra note 8, at 12-13.
35
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
30
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III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. United States’ Reliance on Existing Legislation for Moral Rights
Protection
Eleven states have passed some form of moral rights protection for artists,
including California, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
and Louisiana.36 However, none of this legislation includes musician’s rights
because the definition is limited to fine arts. For now, a musician cannot look to
state statutes, but can only rely on moral rights protection under state contract law,
unfair competition laws, privacy torts or defamation law.37 In terms of federal law,
the remedies are also limited to a case-by-case analysis, without sufficient redress
for an artist’s intent. Such protections do not address the specific goals of moral
rights legislation and are limited to the remedies provided therein.
First, a breach of contract remedy is limited to the contractual provisions
within the contract, and the terms must be agreed on by all parties. In Vargas v.
Esquire Magazine, Inc.,38 illustrator Vargas signed a contract with Esquire
Magazine to publish his drawings of women, which he named “the Varga Girl.”39
After six years, Esquire cancelled the contract, but proceeded to publish three
drawings under the title, “the Esquire Girl.” Vargas sued to enjoin the further
publication of his work, but the Court held that the contract had “divested [Vargas]
of all title, claim and interest in such drawings and designs.”40 Although not
specifically mentioned in the case, this is also an example of the “work-for-hire”
doctrine, which basically exists when a person creates a copyrightable work but
does not own the copyright in it.41 Thus, the Court allowed Esquire Magazine to
falsely publish Vargas’ work against his personal interests at stake, a remedy
otherwise available by the moral rights of integrity and attribution.
Second, under state unfair competition remedies, a case will only be
actionable where the proven deception convinces the public to buy the falsely
attributed product.42 A person may be enjoined from putting an artist’s name on a
product falsely attributed to him or her and in competition with the artist’s own
product. But, what would happen if a digital sampling or mashing musical artist
uses a sample (albeit licensed) in a manner that diminishes the original creator’s
artistic vision and exploits such in a different market?43

36

Desai, supra note 8, at 16.
Id.
38
Swack, supra note 10, at 385 (citing Vargas v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.
1947)).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 384-385.
41
The problem is, in a work-for-hire, the remedy is even more tenuous because the artist is not
considered the creator in the eyes of the law—the employer is considered the original author. See infra
notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
42
Swack, supra note 10, at 384.
43
See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
37
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Under federal law, particularly the Lanham Act,44 some courts will protect
the artist’s moral rights even in the absence of clear federal law. For example, in
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the Court found that the
truncated broadcast by ABC of the Monty Python comedy group violated the
integrity of Python’s work.45 Despite this holding, the Court conversely could
have considered ABC’s use a “fair use” as criticism or review, a point which will
be discussed more thoroughly below.46 Thus, most courts believe the connection
between the Lanham Act and its ability to protect moral rights is tenuous.47
Though it is clear that some courts would like to recognize moral rights, it is
difficult for courts to substantiate moral rights in the absence of definitive
legislation and supportive case law.
Third, although existing defamation and privacy laws are similar to the
integrity moral right, defamation does not cover the work itself, but rather the harm
to an author’s character or name alone.48 In Giesel v. Poynter Products, Inc., the
illustrator and writer Theodore Geisel, writing under the pseudonym of Dr. Seuss,
brought an action against Poynter for selling dolls based on his drawings.49
Although Geisel believed that the dolls were of such poor quality that they
defamed his reputation, the court held that since Poynter exercised “great care,
skill, and judgment” in creating the doll, there was no injury to Geisel’s
professional reputation.50 If moral rights existed, Giesel would have a claim for
infringement of the attribution moral right.
Under privacy laws, one could obtain protection if his or her name were
misappropriated, essentially because an economic interest is at stake; however, the
impact would be more effective if a moral rights aspect is emphasized as well. For
example, Tom Waits, who’s distinctive singing style is often imitated in a number
of commercials, claims, “I have a moral right to my voice. It’s like property.”51 A
Spanish court recently confirmed, finding Audi’s use of Waits’ voice in an
automobile commercial to be more than a property interest, awarding Waits both
$43,000 for copyright infringement and an additional $36,000 for moral rights
violation.52 Although Tom Waits won via privacy laws, he himself emphasizes
that moral rights are equally as important as economic rights.53

44
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). The act addresses “[f]alse
designations of origin and false descriptions.” 15 U.S.C. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
45
Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
46
See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
47
Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 99 (1996) [hereinafter Yonover].
48
Desai, supra note 8, at 16.
49
Swack, supra note 10, at 385 (citing Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
50
Id.
51
Ben Sisario, Still Fighting for the Right to His Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at E3
[hereinafter Sisario].
52
Id. But see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
remedy for a “sound-alike” suit exists because of “an economic interest akin to that of a trademark
holder in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her identity”) (emphasis added).
53
Sisario, supra note 51, at E3.
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I now turn to the “fair use” doctrine, because even VARA, the only
definitive moral rights legislation in the United States, is subject to the fair use
statute of the Copyright Act.54 The fair use defense states that non-owners of the
copyrighted work may use the work in a reasonable manner without consent from
the copyright owner.55 Whether the court allows you to reproduce, distribute,
adapt, display and/or perform copyrighted works depends on a number of factors.56
It is argued that these factors are difficult to apply in a moral rights regime.57
First, under the purpose and character factor, the term “transformative” directly
conflicts with the moral right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or modification of
the original, because an artist presumably believes that any modification devalues
the original work.58 Second, “nature” of the copyrighted work refers to an
intangible work of authorship, rather than the tangible “work” created by the
author.59 The third factor, regarding “amount and substantiality,” is problematic
because this calls for the subjective measurements of quality and quantity “used”
by the defendant and the Court.60 The final factor that affects the legality of the
fair use is the “effect” of such reproduction on potential marketability;61
unfortunately, this factor fails to recognize that moral rights emphasize personal,
rather than economic investments.62
Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists a number of ways for a use to be
considered “fair,” including criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research.63 However, in music, fair use is principally witnessed in
the case of a parody of a song, a concept that directly opposes the purpose of moral
rights. An often cited case illustrating this point is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.64 This case involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s rendition of Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman.” Campbell sought the permission of Acuff-Rose, the
copyright owners, to use the song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”65 Campbell told AcuffRose that the parody would credit the original authors and copyright owners, and
that he was willing to pay reasonable royalties for the use of the original in the
parody.66 Nonetheless, Acuff-Rose, as representative of the original creator, was

54

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Desai, supra note 8, at 17.
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). These factors include: “(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.” Id.
57
Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 33, 81 (1997).
58
Id. at 83-86.
59
Id. at 86.
60
Id. at 87.
61
Id. at 88.
62
Id. at 88-89.
63
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005).
64
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
65
Id. at 572.
66
Id.
55
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not interested in this proposal.67 Campbell paid no attention to Acuff-Rose’s
objection and published the parody in the album “As Clean As They Wanna Be,”
still crediting the original authors.68
In essence, 2 Live Crew’s rendition was a form of piracy because the
underlying work was used without permission, despite crediting the original
author. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the parody lyrics were a fair
use.69 The Court reasoned that if “a work targets another for humorous or ironic
effect, it is by definition a new creative work,” despite the original author’s
objections.70
This suggests that someone could claim fair use as a defense for abridging an
artist’s moral rights, “the special bond that exists between creator and creation.”71
Therefore, without a fair use defense, an artist has a “greater chance of success in
an infringement suit because of the deference afforded an artist’s reputation and
honor in a moral rights system.”72
On the other hand, the promotion of creativity is the crux of the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, whereby “Progress would be stifled if the author had a
complete monopoly of everything.”73 Not only can criticism, critique and satire
“Progress . . . Science,” as dictated by the Constitution,74 but often a piece based

67

Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 573.
69
Id. at 594.
70
Id. at 598-99 (Kennedy J., concurring).
71
Yonover, supra note 47, at 89.
72
Brandon G. Williams, Note, James Brown v. In-Frin-Jr: How Moral Rights Can Steal the
Groove, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L 651, 660 (2000) [hereinafter Williams].
73
Diego A. Ramos, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” Luke Took Your Beauty Away, May NAFTA Come to
Your Rescue? Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Can There Ever Be “Moral Rights” in the United States or
Puerto Rico, 29 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 173, 182 (1994). Ramos illustrates a number of cases, where the
Court held that the public good surpasses an artist’s or copyright owner’s interests. See e.g. Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 499-500 (1984) (holding that time-shifting allows
people to copy copyrighted works for viewing at a later time); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (finding that copyright law inspires artistic creativity for the public good).
It is stated most eloquently in the patent case of Graham v. John Deere Co. that: “The Congress in
the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of .
. . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.” Graham,
383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
74
In Samuel Johnson’s “A Dictionary of the English Language,” the most authoritative dictionary
in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the first definition for “science” was “knowledge.” Edward
C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional
Power, 43 IDEA 1, n. 42 (2002). Also, knowledge reflected an important point in common for eight of
the twelve state copyright statutes, which sought to enact intellectual property rights for the ultimate
betterment of humankind. Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1809 (2006).
President George Washington affirmed this focus in addressing the first Congress: “Knowledge is, in
every country, the surest basis of public happiness.” L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in
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on another piece is not intended as an infringement but as a new work in and of
itself. Furthermore, a number of other jurisdictions recognizing moral rights also
accept some form of fair use: i.e. “fair dealing” in England; “free utilization” in
Germany; and France’s exemption for “parodies, pastiches and caricatures.”75
To rebut this, Professor Ginsburg of the Columbia Law School appeared
before the House subcommittee considering VARA and said: “The original or few
copies with which the artist was most in contact embody the artist’s ‘personality’
far more closely than subsequent mass produced images. . . .”76 Thus, while fair
use needs to remain intact to a certain degree, we must recognize that the artist’s
integrity, reputation, and honor are all at stake in a pirated world. Artists and all
the parties who contract with them must understand that full protection exists only
if a moral rights clause becomes part of American copyright law, which is not
presently so.
B. Artists Contract with the Pirates
The biggest problem an artist faces without moral rights protection is the
artist contract. Currently, the industry norm is for an artist, as an original
copyright owner, to relinquish all authority over his or her work to either the
record company or the publishing house.77 What makes this so common is the
existence of essentially two copyrights that exist in a musical work—composition
rights and performance rights; and therefore two potential economic streams to
flow from such copyrights—mechanical royalties and performance royalties.78
The problem is that the composition copyright is held by the writer or publisher,
and the performance copyright, as a mechanical royalty, is held by the record

Framers did not intend to vest in Congress anything akin to the English royal grant in the creation and
assignment of monopolistic privileges.
Accordingly, when Congress enacted the first national Copyright Act in 1790, the emphasis was on
the utilitarian public interest model. The Act was entitled: “‘An Act for the encouragement of learning,
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during
the times therein mentioned.’ If the property right rationale were controlling, a different title would
have been expected. For example, titles such as ‘An Act for the protection of authors and proprietors of
copies, to secure to them their property in maps, charts, and books’ or ‘An Act for securing property of
authors and proprietors of copies in their maps, charts, and books’ would be more consistent with a
property right rationale.” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting
the Past and Ignoring Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 427-28 (2004). Similarly, the
Supreme Court’s early rulings treated copyright as a statutory creation designed to serve the public
benefit and only secondarily to reward authors. See e.g. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) and
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1879).
75
Paul Nicholas Boylan, Reconciling Artist’s Moral Rights with Economic Principles and the
Problem of Parody: Some Modest Proposals, 1 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMUNICATIONS (2005),
available at http://www.uclan.ac.uk/facs/class/legalstu/JoLaw&Comms/2005_1/boylan-2.htm
[hereinafter Boylan].
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Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No.
101-514, at 6922 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6922 (statement of Prof. Jane C.
Ginsburg).
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Desai, supra note 8, at 18.
78
Id. at 19-21.
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company through the negotiated recording agreement.79 Presently, unless the artist
is also the composer, in no way is an artist’s moral integrity protected. Such
agreements leave an artist without much control over his or her music.80 Not only
do recording contracts require artists to record exclusively for one record company,
but contracts also preclude artists from re-recording a selection for another record
company.81 Consequently, many musicians “sign whatever agreement they get in
order to ensure some recording deal.”82 In most situations, artists (especially new
artists) are forced to forfeit any moral rights they potentially have in order to make
a living.83
For example, “record companies have exclusive rights to reproduction, the
preparation of derivate works, distribution, and public performance through digital
audio transmission.”84 And, if record companies merge, a musician can find that
his or her existing contract and music are no longer held to the original standard.85
Thus, “musicians can easily lose control over their artistic vision based on custom
in record contracts, without record companies even taking much risk.”86
Another hurdle a musician presently faces is the need to get music played.
Under the current licensing scheme, any venue that has an American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) license, can play the song or use the
song in any way they please.87 Even if the artist disagrees with such use, the artist
cannot prevent such use under existing licensing law.88 But, what happens when
“a song is played and used out of context,” thereby “desecrat[ing] the song,
musician, and listeners[?]”89 Musicians should be entitled the right to protect
against licensing schemes that violate authorship intent, and currently this is not an
option.
There are three main types of licenses: mechanical, performance, and
synchronization.90 First, mechanical licenses permit reproduction in forms that use
a mechanical device to play sound, such as records and compact discs.91 The
musical copyright owner is given by law the first right to distribute the mechanical
recordings, or the “mechanicals.”92 Once distributed for the first time, anyone can
make his or her own recording of the song and distribute it to the public.93 The
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main issue here is that the artist loses control over the future prospects of the work,
relinquishing personal authority over his or her work and original intent.
Digital sampling and/or “cover songs” also have potential moral rights
implications, despite courts focusing on economic implications through
compulsory licenses.94 If one looks at the case concerning Biz Markie’s
unlicensed use of a sample from Raymond “Gilbert” O’Sullivan’s 1972 hit “Alone
Again,” this holding “seems limited to instances where the composer is also the
copyright owner, as it focuses on the copyright owner’s proprietary rights and not
on the creator’s moral rights. As such, it has no direct bearing on the composer’s
moral rights of attribution and integrity.”95 Therefore, although the artist may
invoke copyright law under an economic regime, a moral rights system ensures the
ultimate protection of an artist’s creation when the artist no longer retains the
copyright.
Second, performance licenses allow an entity to perform a musical work
publicly. Performing Rights Societies, such as ASCAP, Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI) and Sesac, Inc. police the use of musical works and distributes royalties
based on these performances.96 However, these Societies fail to protect use of
musical works outside their original moral intention, particularly because more
play means more money, regardless of when or where the song gets played.
For example, Bruce Springsteen’s song, “Born in the U.S.A.,” was written to
tell the story of a Vietnam Veteran who comes home to an America “that seems to
fail him in return.”97 Once Springsteen released the song, he was enraged by
people who invoked his song as a patriotic anthem. He refused to sell the licensing
rights for a Chrysler commercial, an offer estimated to be worth twelve to sixteen
million dollars.98 Nevertheless, Performing Rights Societies declined to uphold his
wishes, and used their authority to play the song to invoke patriotism, contrary to
Springsteen’s intent. 99 Springsteen had no recourse under present law.
Additionally, many artists are subject to blanket licenses, which enable a
person to pay an annual fee to play one or more titles in the society’s music
catalogue.100 These blanket licenses are too “broad” and potentially allow the
licensee to infringe on an artist’s attribution and integrity rights.101 Ultimately, the
current licensing laws do not give the artist authority over how and when his or her
creation is manipulated, performed or distributed.102
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The third type of licensing, synchronization, authorizes a musical work to be
used in an audiovisual piece, such as a motion picture or television show.103 In
Shostakovich v. 20th Century Fox, a recognized Russian composer objected to the
use of his music in an anti-communist film.104 The court refused to enjoin the
names or music because the music was in the public domain and no longer retained
copyright protection.105 However, the case was also litigated in France, where the
French court found there was “undoubtedly a moral damage.”106 If moral rights
were recognized and enforced in the United States, the outcome would most likely
follow the French rationale.107
The above three licensing examples are usually in the form of a written
contract. The problem with such contracts is that they are economic in nature and
do not address moral rights considerations. ASCAP, BMI and Sesac need to exist
because they are important regulators of these licenses, by “provid[ing] a valuable
service of monitoring use of songs and providing economic returns.” 108
Ultimately, an artist should retain the right to retract such licenses from repeated
use once the integrity of the work is violated, such as performed out of context or
sampled inappropriately.
C. An Economic Paradigm Fails to Combat Piracy Problems
To combat piracy, the Recording Industry Association of America
(“RIAA”), the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), and other
entities within the music and movie industry first used an economic-based
argument to successfully litigate against peer-to-peer companies in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., and In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.109 More recently, in
cases such as Metro-Golden-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., peer-to-peer companies
have successfully overturned the very legislation created to regulate them.110 Now,
in a panic, the industry has attempted to sue individual file sharers, who use these
companies for pirating, promising to do so until consumers “get the message.”111
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Unfortunately, these suits have been criticized as being “excessive,” “heavyhanded,” “horrible” and “counterproductive,” because not only do individual filesharers have limited funds to defend litigation, but this is also a “public relations
nightmare” for artists and the industry as a whole.112 Furthermore, these court
decisions do not significantly lower the number of people file-sharing.113
Although file-sharing activity immediately declined after these lawsuits ensued,
file-sharing increased at a higher rate after a short period of time elapsed.114
The bottom line is that economic-based litigation and legislation are not
solving the problems of piracy.115 I propose that a moral rights approach would
drive a new incentive for illegal down-loaders to stop pirating. This incentive
would first result in increased respect for artists, and in turn, justify profits for the
recording industry as a whole.

IV. ADDRESSING THE SOLUTION
A. Deficiencies in the Current Copyright Act
1.

Expanding “Work of Visual Art” to Parallel Broader
Terminology in the Copyright Act

VARA is limited to a “work of visual art,” defined as “a painting, drawing,
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. . . ,”116 thereby
excluding musical or audiovisual work.117 There are a number of potential
problems with this limited definition.
First, the VARA definition directly conflicts with the subject matter
prominently, along with college students and (to the industry’s embarrassment) a teenaged recent
immigrant from Poland, whose stash of online music turned out to include mostly recordings of Polish
folks songs and Hungarian hip-hop – two genres of music not controlled by the five companies that
‘own’ [ninety] percent of the nation’s music.” Id.
112
Id. at 284-85.
113
Id.
114
Maryann Jones Thompson, Files Sharers Running Scared?, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Nov. 2005,
at 12.
115
Copyright Laws, supra note 30. For example, there is the Federal Anti-Bootleg Statute, which
prohibits the unauthorized recording, manufacture, distribution or trafficking in sound recordings or
videos of artists’ live musical performances, and violators can be criminally punished with up to 5 years
in prison and $250,000 in fines. Id. There is also the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA),
which allows consumers to make copies of copyrighted material for personal use; the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA), which allows copyright owners of sound
recordings the right to authorize public performances of their works; and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1996 (DMCA), which prohibits the manufacture and distribution of devices designed
for the sole purpose of tampering with technology used to protect copyrighted works. Id. Though these
are effective forms of regulation, they are mainly economic and still do not address the significant issue
of an artist’s moral interests.
116
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
117
Id.
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protected in the Copyright Act as a whole, which includes musical works,
particularly any accompanying words, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, and sound recordings.118 Thus, I propose that in granting moral rights to
the artist (as opposed to the economic copyrights which rest with the composer,
publisher and record company), the Bill must apply to every form of music: from
tangible media such as compact discs, vinyl albums, analogue cassette tapes; to
modifications of these media into MP3s, singles, ring tones, master tones; to
performances of this media such as concerts, music videos, appearances in
television and motion pictures, and even video games. A bill covering every form
of music will ultimately target the stronghold of recording, licensing and
publishing agreements. It will ensure that artists are protected in every medium in
which their work is likely released. For recording companies, publishing houses
and licensing societies, this invariably means a new party, with an equally strong
incentive, looking out for potential infringement.
Donald Passman would agree. In his discussion of creative control in All
You Need to Know About the Music Business, he notes that in lieu of an author’s
moral rights for music or lyrics, artists must protect themselves by putting a moral
rights concept in their songwriter or publisher contract.119
VARA also defines “work of visual art” to exclude “any work made for
hire. . . .”120 This involuntary exclusion “effectively makes freedom of speech
alienable” by placing the economic interest in a work superior to the creative
integrity and attribution right of the artist.121 In other words, for an entity to
purchase copyrights or obtain them through work for hire conflicts with the artist’s
fundamental right to preserve personal expression.122 This directly refutes the
purpose of moral rights, specifically because “the employee is really the
instrumentality through which the employer’s creativity is manifested.”123
One may argue that an artist, as an employee, specifically signs a contract
understanding the nature of the job and that the employer becomes the author.
However, since the nature of most employment is based on an economic paradigm,
an employer’s interest in the economic copyright should not also compel an artist
to relinquish his or her moral rights under works made for hire, unless specifically
negotiated otherwise.124 Under a newly fashioned work for hire doctrine, the
employer would maintain authority over the copyright while the artist would retain
his or her moral right in the work.
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Broadening the Moral Rights Offered to Mirror European
Counterparts

VARA specifically grants the moral rights of attribution and integrity, the
former being a right to be given credit, claim credit, and deny credit if a work is
changed, and the latter being a right to ensure that the work is not changed without
the artist’s consent.125 These rights must be recognized in the licensing and
recording agreement schemes.
The exclusive right to create a “derivative work” under §106(2) of the
Copyright Act may appear to parallel “modification” under the integrity or
attribution moral right.126 However, the right to create a derivative work rests with
the owner of the copyright,127 which in an economic model is not the creator but
the recording company. When someone other than the artist owns both the original
work and its copyright, any license granted to create a derivative work would
directly negate an artist’s moral right to prevent modification.128
One may look to “cover songs” or “samples” under compulsory licenses and
think that moral integrity protection exists for an artist. If someone “covers” a
song, they cannot “change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work.”129 However, even a “cover song” has moral rights implications, depending
on who the original publisher administers these rights to and on what conditions.130
By adding a moral rights element to that license, an artist can ensure that the work
does not fundamentally change, and that the right to authorize derivative works
complements the integrity right.
This would also apply in the case of “fair use.” While criticism, comment,
news reporting, and research are justifiable ends for the use of an artist’s work, a
parody should be subject to moral rights approval by the author. For example,
while some artists might see potential profit by a fair use, others may not, as seen
in the 2 Live Crew case.131 The decision should rest with the artist, and then the
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127
§ 101(2).
128
Symposium, Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 913 (1993) [hereinafter Karlen].
129
Desai, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2) (1994)).
130
See Passman, supra note 119, at 270-272.
131
Another great example involves Danger Mouse’s, The Grey Album, which mashed together the
Beatles’ White Album with Jay-Z’s The Black Album. While Jay-Z enjoyed the publicity and
encouraged the use, EMI, who claimed to control the Beatles’ copyright, objected to such use. See
generally, The Grey Album by Danger Mouse, BANNEDMUSIC.ORG, available at http://www.banned
music.org/albums/grey_album.php (last visited April 22, 2006).

198

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. I:1

copyright owner once the author(s) passes away, so long as the copyright exists.132
Instead of finding an inherent conflict and discrepancy between the Copyright Act
and moral rights legislation, these two legal models should work to complement
each other.
France, the world leader of moral rights legislation, agrees with this
rationale.133 The most famous French case involving the right of integrity
involved painter Bernard Buffet, who “created a painting on the panels of a
refrigerator.”134 The refrigerator owner, who recognized the economic value of
each panel, decided to deconstruct the refrigerator and sell each panel as an
individual work of art.135 This example is similar to a digital sampling artist using
one piece of a song and selling the sample as a new work.136 Buffet filed suit,
claiming that his work was an “indivisible artistic unit.”137 The Court recognized
that modification to the work compromised its artistic integrity, and despite the
copyright owner’s economic interest, the moral rights of the author were upheld.138
Like the Buffet case, a music recording company, as the new copyright
owner, could find it more profitable to sell songs as singles rather than as one
complete album. But, what if the artist had an artistic vision that the entire album
was “an experience” and needed to be listened as a whole? Or, take the example
of Bruce Springsteen, where licensing companies licensed “Born in the U.S.A.” for
patriotic gatherings contrary to Springsteen’s intended message.139 The need for
integrity and attribution rights should remain with the artist, despite any signed
licensing or recording agreements.
Also, the law should be expanded to include two additional rights recognized
under French law. These two rights are: the right to divulge, otherwise termed the
right to publication, and the right to retract.140 A principal case regarding
divulgation involved the artist James McNeil Whistler and his painting “Whistler’s
Mother.”141 In that case, Lord Eden sued Whistler over the painting of Lady
Eden.142 Although Whistler arguably completed the work in question, he refused
to divulge the work.143 Although the Court required Whistler to refund Lord Eden,
the Court held that Whistler had the inherent right as creator to decide when the
work was complete, and therefore the buyer could not force the artist to relinquish
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See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text (discussing transfer, waiver, and term
provisions).
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his work.144
The same reasoning from the Whistler case should apply to the music
industry. For example, a record company may contract with an artist to complete a
certain number of albums, but the artist does not like one of the albums, despite the
record company insisting on the release due to contractual provisions agreed upon
by both parties. The moral right of divulgation would give the artist the right to
decide when the work is ready for distribution, although the artist must then agree
to refund or partially refund the record company, as in Whistler, to respect the
economic interest at stake.
American copyright law should also include the right of retraction, a right
existing in France since the eighteenth century, which allows an artist “to alter or
withdraw a work already in distribution.”145 This is “presumably exercised when a
work no longer reflects its creator’s beliefs and personality,” which are directly
tied to the work of authorship.146 For example, in the event that the work is
transferred into another medium, such as a motion picture or ring tone, if this new
media conflicts with original intent, then the artist should have the right to retract.
As with the publication right, this right would also be subject to contractual
compensation provisions, subject to parameters like sale minimums or length of
the contract.147
3.

Re-Writing Transfer and Waiver Provisions

VARA currently states that moral rights may not be transferred, but those
rights “may be waived if the author expressly agrees to” do so.148 In terms of
transfer provisions, “the reality of the marketplace means that authors do place an
economic value on their work, and inalienable moral rights could be viewed as a
limitation on the constitutional concept of liberty with respect to an artist’s
freedom to make a contract.”149 A creator’s refusal to hand over these rights,
despite the threat of liability or loss of employment, provides evidence that there is
more than a mere economic value to these rights.150 The main problem with a no
transfer provision occurs when an author passes away, but the copyright subsists.
Therefore, to ensure that the moral integrity of a work is upheld so long as the
work remains protectable by copyright, the inclusion of transferable moral rights
must be an option for the artist.
There are also several potential issues with the VARA waiver provisions. If
there are joint authors, VARA currently states that waiver can be exercised by one
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author on behalf of all joint authors.151 This provision is particularly problematic
for musicians, whose work is often based on joint authorship. If waiver is
exercised by one minor artist on behalf of the others, this could be disastrous for
the principal artists.152 For example, in Seshadri v. Kasarian,153 the Court noted
that in such a case where the joint work,
is marred by errors reflecting unfavorably on his coauthor, with quantifiable
adverse effects on the coauthor’s career, the coauthor might conceivably have some
legal remedy, but it wouldn’t be under Copyright Act. We don’t know what it
would be under: possibly the law of contracts; in Europe it might be a violation of
the author’s ‘moral right’ (droit moral), the right to the integrity of his work.

This statement goes a long way to prove that a remedy should be implemented to
appease all moral interests at stake.
Another problem with a waiver provision is that it subjects artists to unequal
bargaining power, whereby artists are invariably forced to sell moral rights to
contract with a recording or publishing house. Such waiver provisions highlight
the economic interests that guide United States copyright law.154 Nevertheless,
waiver provisions are important for an artist who needs the money. Ultimately, it
should be the choice of the artist (or artists in the case of joint authorship) to agree
to any waiver.
4.

Lengthening the Term

The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended United States
copyright law to life of the author plus 70 years.155 However, VARA is simply
limited to life of the artist. Although moral rights are specifically intended for the
artist, the copyright holder may be aware of the integrity of the work at stake.
Under Berne Convention standards, moral rights last as long as economic rights.156
Therefore, I advise that the same term provisions should apply within American
moral rights legislation, provided that the moral rights are transferred by the
author(s).
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Draft Language: “THE MORAL RIGHTS ACT OF 2007”

§ 101 Definitions
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding the following definitions in section 101:
A “moral right owner,” with respect to any one of the moral rights
comprised in a copyright, refers to the creator of that particular right, and
independent of the owner of the copyright.
§ 106 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works, subject to moral rights approval
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the beginning of section 106 the following sentence:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights, subject to moral rights approval, to
do any of the following:
§106A Subject matter of moral rights
(a) Title – This Amendment will now be called the “Moral Rights Act of
2006”
(b) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the beginning of section 106A the following section:
(1) Moral rights protection subsists, in accordance with § 102(a) of
the Copyright Act, in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
a. Literary works;
b. Musical works, including any accompanying words;
c. Dramatic works, including any accompanying
music;
d. Pantomimes and choreographic works;
e. Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
f. Motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
g. Sound recordings; and
h. Architectural works
(2) In no case does moral rights protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, or principle.
(3) Any section within 106A will replace “work of visual art” with
“work of authorship.”
(c) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding to
subsection (a) of section 106A, the following: Rights of attribution,
integrity, divulgation and retraction –
(1) Shall have the right –
a. To claim authorship of that work,
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To prevent the use of his or her name as the author
of any work of authorship which he or she did not
create,
c. To prevent publication if the author is not satisfied
with any work of authorship, and
d. To renounce a work and withdraw it from sale or
display.
(d) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by replacing
subsection (d) of section 106A with, the following:
(1) Duration of rights –
a. With respect to works of authorship, the rights shall
endure for a term consisting of the life of the author,
unless specifically transferred in who or in part by
any means of conveyance or by operation of law,
and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal
property by the applicable laws of intestate
cessation.
b. The term shall not exceed the expiry of the copyright
of the work, subject to Chapter 3 of title 17, United
States Code, section 302.
(e) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by replacing
subsection (e) of section 106A with, the following:
(1) Transfer – Transfer provisions are subject to Chapter 2 of title
17, United States Code, section 201A.
(2) Waiver –
a. Moral rights may be waived if the author expressly
agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed
by the author. Such instrument shall specifically
identify the work, and uses of that work, to which
the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only
to the work and uses so identified.
b. In the case of a joint work, waiver must be
consensual to each author of the work.
c. There shall be no blanket waivers encompassing
transferability of moral rights.
(f) Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding
subsection (f) of section 106A with, the following: Remedies for moral
rights infringement –
(1) Remedies include –
a. Injunction,
b. Damages limited to actual damages or unjust
enrichment, excluding any right to punitive
damages, as consistent with the notion that these
rights are personal and not pecuniary in nature
c. Further damages sought are appealable.
(2) In the case of divulgation or retraction, the moral rights owner
may be subject to refund or partially refund the copyright owner
for any express agreement not fulfilled, in due part to the
exercise of the moral rights.
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§ 107 Limitations on exclusive and moral rights: Fair use
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the beginning of section 107 the following sentence:
(1) Fair Use is appropriate for –
a. Criticism, Comment, News Reporting, Teaching,
Scholarship, and Research.
b. Parodies are strictly subject to moral rights approval
by the author(s).
§ 115 Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works: Compulsory
license for making and distributing phonorecords
(a) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
changing section 115(b)(1) and adding section (b)(1)(a) as follows: Notice
of Intention to Obtain Compulsory License –
(1) Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory license under
this section shall, before or within thirty days after making, and
before distributing any phonorecords of the work, serve notice
of intention to do so on the copyright owner and moral rights
owner.
(2) There shall be no blanket licenses.
(b) In general – Chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding to section 115(c)(1) the following sentence: Royalty Payable under
Compulsory License –
(1) The moral rights owner is not entitled to royalties for
phonorecords made and distributed after being so identified,
nor entitled to recover for any phonorecords previously made
and distributed, unless expressly agreed in a written instrument
signed by the parties otherwise.
§ 201A. Ownership of moral rights
(a) In general – Chapter 2 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
adding the following section after section 201: Ownership of moral
rights–
(1) Author Ownership – Moral rights in a work protected under
this title vests only in the author of the work. The authors of a
joint work are coowners of moral rights in the work.
(2) Works Made for Hire – In the case of a work made for hire,
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared
is not considered the author for purposes of this title, unless
the parties have expressly agreed in a written instrument
signed by them otherwise that the moral right owner expressly
assigns the moral rights to the employer or person for whom
the work was prepared.
(3) Transfer of Ownership –
a. The ownership of a moral right may be transferred
in who or in part by any means of conveyance or by
operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or
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pass as personal property by the applicable laws of
intestate cessation.
In the case of a joint work, transfer must be subject
to express transfer, consensual to each author of the
work.
V.

BILL OPPOSITION

A. The Recording Companies and Publishing Houses
The most influential group that will oppose the Moral Rights Act of 2007
will be the recording companies and publishing houses, who currently have the
most control over an artist’s music with regards to the composition rights,
performance rights and licensing rights—all customarily signed away in the
recording or publishing agreement. Nevertheless, these entities should not fear the
introduction of broad moral rights legislation. Once moral rights are recognized in
this era of digitization, such regulation could help generate more money and fair
recognition for artists and creators in the industry as a whole by potentially
elevating the moral awareness of the pirating public.
“The notion of the greedy record company improperly exploiting artists may
not be too far from the truth.”157 This greed could be a main source of opposition
to moral rights legislation for musicians, but it may also be the ultimate
justification. The record industry will argue that after the widespread use of free
music download and file-share sites such as Napster, and successor companies like
Kazaa and Morpheus, the RIAA attacked the legality of peer-to-peer networks by
appealing to the moral values of consumers downloading music.158 The record
industry attempted to use guilt, as well as the potential for legal sanctions, to deter
copyright infringement. “The RIAA has argued that downloading an MP3 is the
equivalent of stealing a CD from a record store. . . . “159 Nevertheless,
“[a]ccording to a 2003 Gallup poll, a staggering eighty-three percent of thirteen to
seventeen-year-olds think that file-sharing is morally acceptable.”160 A big reason
for this sentiment is that individuals believe compact disc prices are too high.161
When one looks at the configuration of the music industry, the consumer sees the
record company controlling the rights and pocketing most of the money, leaving
artists in an un-recouped world.162
While it is “hard for many Americans to feel guilty about ‘stealing’ music by
downloading free MP3s when they consider the recording industry to have been
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stealing from its artists for decades,”163 moral protection for artists could appeal to
a new value within the up-loader’s and down-loader’s consciousness. This value
respects the longevity of moral intentions as well as the economic life to which a
work is presently entitled. Instead of lawsuits against individuals based on
economic incentives for industry moguls, the music industry should focus on the
moral interests of the artist. An expansive education campaign to inform the
public about moral rights, and what this means for artists, could appeal to the
purchasing power of consumers. With this new value woven into social
consciousness, the consumer would feel guilty for stealing from the “struggling”
artist, rather than the record industry or publishing house conglomerates. This, in
turn, would lessen illegal uploading, downloading, and file-sharing. Not only
would the artist’s interests be protected, but the record companies would also see
an economic windfall from the increase in purchased music.
B. Illegal Down-Loaders
Another group to oppose the Bill would be the millions of Americans who
benefit from expansive libraries of illegally downloaded music. The success of
peer-to-peer file-sharing is in large part due to the fact that such networks “give
users more control over the entertainment they consume.”164 Moreover, filesharing, CD burning and even hard-drive swapping are easy to do.
The truth is Americans and the public-at-large presently do not have the
incentive to stop illegal uploading, downloading, and file-sharing. If we appealed
to the public’s moral values, there may be the potential for a major shift in the
public’s perspective with increased respect for the artist. The solution would be
for artists to speak publicly about moral integrity, emphasize what it means to them
personally, and how illegal downloads affect their ability to make a living. Artists
could utilize campaign techniques similar to those used in sex education, voter
participation, or environmental initiatives. Within this framework, an artist can tell
the public that he or she will refuse to divulge, or even retract a song, if illegal
copyright infringement continues.165
The apparent counter-argument is: why would any artist do this? More
illegally downloaded music means more people listening to an artist’s music,
which translates into more merchandise and concert sales—the primary way artists
make money in today’s market environment.166 At first, this might seem like a
great sacrifice for an artist. In the long run, moral rights become an extremely
valuable concept for artists both economically and creatively. Since the public
wants artists to create, artists ultimately hold the bargaining chip. When the future
potential and excitement of creativity is jeopardized by negatively affecting the

163

Lantagne, supra note 3 at 280.
Id. at 274.
165
See supra note 143-47 and accompanying text (regarding the need for a divulgation and
retraction right).
166
Tom Zeller, Jr., Pew File-Sharing Survey Gives a Voice to Artists, NYTIMES.COM, Dec. 6, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/arts/06down.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=11902
40405-aX1OfeWpT7nr4pR7Ff7F3Q.
164

206

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. I:1

integrity of a work, the public might think twice before it downloads illegal files.
C. Digital Sampling and Mashing Artists
Another group to possibly oppose the Bill would be artists who engage in
digital sampling, a common trend found in electronic and hip-hop music. As
Passman says, “[u]nless you’ve been living in a cave for the last few years, you
know that every rapper on the planet samples freely from other people’s works.”167
This technique, also referred to as “appropriationism,” allows an artist to
incorporate previously copyrighted work into a new work.168 Currently, there are a
number of licensing schemes in place before a digital sampling or mashing artist
can theoretically release an album with samples. In fact, “[r]ecord companies
won’t release a recording containing samples without assurances that the samples
have been cleared” by both the record company owning the sampled recording and
the publisher of the sampled musical composition.169
But what about clearing the samples with the artist, the true creator? If a
sampling or mashing artist misappropriates another artist’s original creation, then
there are largely pecuniary remedies to make the original artist seemingly whole
again. If such sampling offends an artist’s moral rights, then under moral rights
legislation, the artist would have authority to say that he or she does not want his
or her work attributed to the sample. The artist would have the right to retract that
sample. Just as digital sampling artists must succumb to compulsory licensing
schemes, such samplers should also come to understand a release on a license
might offend an artist’s moral rights.170 This is not much more an extension of
rights clearance than presently exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most apparent reason to explain why moral rights have been excluded
from United States Copyright Law is that there is a fear that the existence of
personal rights for artists would negatively impair the social goals, and invariably
the economic framework, of copyright law in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution. On a social level, can you imagine every artist in
America claiming moral integrity, attribution, publication and retraction rights to
works of authorship? The enforcement of an artist’s creative rights would
seemingly result in increased litigation, greater expense to the public, and limit
widespread dissemination of information.171
Ultimately, the long experience of many nations indicates that recognizing moral
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rights and restricting their alienability is not obviously lethal to such goals as
equitable remuneration or public dissemination. The issue then seems not whether
moral rights and economic rights can cohabit, but how some combination can be
172
most beneficial to society.

In my view, the combination of moral and economic rights benefits society
when the creator, who has a personal stake and familiarity with the work, takes
responsibility and holds ultimate moral title to his or her creations. Proper
attribution helps the public recognize a work’s authenticity. Retraction may solve
concerns associated with technology, where information is widely disseminated
against an artist’s wishes. Integrity allows an artist to control future uses of his
works, such as a parody or sample, which are currently at the disposal of the record
company or publishing house. Finally, a publication right may inspire an artist to
create a greater number of works, and because of a heightened interest in those
works, there may be an impetus to improve personal standards, and thereby
enhance artistic quality overall.173
We all know the problem: music piracy is rampant. A kid illegally
downloading music in his or her college dorm is just as culpable as a pirate with a
peg-leg storming a ship on the high seas for booty. Piracy is the impetus for us to
promote the importance of moral rights. Once the public becomes informed that
such rights exist, recording companies will be justly compensated, legal download
quality will increase for consumers, and artists will finally receive the protection
they deserve. Thus, despite a threat of increased litigation or a periodic decline in
dissemination, moral rights must be considered and enacted into the United States
Copyright Act.
Moral rights legislation will work because it has been tried and tested. These
rights have existed in Europe for centuries, with great success and little disruption
to the copyright system and the profitability of the recording industry, including
the economic and creative well-being of artists.
Congress has already
implemented VARA, and now needs to take moral rights protection one step
further to protect the music industry.

172

Id. at 777.
“To put it negatively: a distributed work which is not an accurate reflection of an author’s skill
discourages learned people from composing—or at least from getting an advance for—future works.”
Mike Holderness, Moral Rights and Authors’ Rights: The Key to the Information Age¸ JOURNAL OF
INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 4 (1998), http://www.poptel.org.uk/nuj/mike/jilt-mr.htm.
173

